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SYNALLAGMA AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
The Concept of Reciprocity and Fairness in Contracts from the Historical
and Law and Economics Perspective
Introduction
The problem of commutative justice has been widely analysed by the contemporary
doctrine of civil law. Simultaneously there is a profound debate about the meaning of
commutative justice and equivalence in exchange within the sphere of moral philosophy. All
these issues seem to concern the problem of interdependence between parties. Such
interdependence is called synallagma or the principle of synallagma. In this paper I would like
to present the concept of synallagma in civil law and in philosophy of law. Since the dispute
in both disciplines seems to be unresolved and inconclusive, I would like to present the two
economic theories concerning synallagma as the strategic interaction between agents. The
most appropriate tool to be implemented seems to be the game theory. In conclusion I would
like to address the question whether substantial and objective equivalence in contracts is
possible or under which conditions it is meaningful.
The problem
Historically the tension between the free-bargaining principle and the requirement of
equity or fairness
1 in exchange may be indicated. On the one hand, the majority of legal
systems does not require the existence of equivalence between obligations, especially in case
of bilateral (synallagmatic) or reciprocal contracts. According to this doctrine of genetic
synallagma, the inner structure of such a contract consists of reciprocal obligations i.e.
obligations of two parties. The interdependence between the obligations of both parties means
than both of them are potentially liable, not that the economic values of obligations are equal.
The system of common law does not require equivalence of consideration, the French law
regards reciprocity as subjective as well as BGB. At the same time all legal systems contain
some mechanisms to correct harsh bargains or grossly unfair transactions.
It seems that the problem of fairness in exchange is closely related with the notion of
commutative justice. It is Aristotle who distinguished the difference between distributive and
commutative justice in the V-th book of Nichomachean Ethics. Distributive justice is based
on geometric proportion, depending on the hierarchy of public goods. Generally it may be
said, that the norms of distributive justice allocate the goods to persons according to the
criterion of distribution established by the public authority. Corrective and rectificatory justice
is based on arithmetic proportion between the gain and loss, especially in case of torts or
unjust enrichment. According to the contemporary interpretations, corrective justice
encapsulates certain notion of equality
2. This equality is often called “formal equality of
treatment”. There is, however, the third kind of justice, namely commutative justice.
                                                       
The author wishes to kindly thank Prof. Hans-Bernd Schaefer, Director of the Institute of Law and Economics,
University of Hamburg and Prof. Manfred Holler, Institute of Socioeconomics, University of Hamburg for their
fruitful comments and help while writing this paper. However, all the responsibility for the article's content
remains with the author.
1 In this article I regard fairness according to Varian as efficiency (weak Pareto optimality) and envy-freeness
(equitable allocation); cf. H. R. Varian, „Equity, Envy and Efficiency”, Journal of Economic Theory 9 (1974), p.
63-91.
2 P. Benson, „The Basis of Corrective Justice and Its Relation to Distributive Justice”, Iowa Law Review 77
(1992), p. 535.
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Commutative justice concerns equality in exchange. Within the literature commutative justice
is very often identified with corrective justice. This is partly due to the confusion in the text of
Nichomachean Ethics. Aristotle in one place opposes commutative justice to distributive
justice. He explains, however, the difference between voluntary legal relations, namely
transactions, and involuntary relations, such as wrongdoing. Voluntary transactions are not
assessed from the perspective of equality between the loss and the gain. They are based on
commutative justice identified with terms of contract itself. The confusion about the character
of commutative justice is in my opinion the reason for many inadequate theories of contract.
Therefore the question arises whether contract may be objectively just and if so, whether just
contract is in fact a contract according to which the gains of two parties are equal.
I will claim that the concept of objective equivalence of obligation in contract is
meaningless. The first argument stems from the interpretation of the historical evolution of
contract law. In classical Roman law no equivalence was required. The notion of substantial
equivalence resulted only in the Middle Ages from the misinterpretation of the Aristotelian
concept of commutative justice and of Roman Law.
The second argument is provided by the contemporary economics. It seems that it is
not just a coincidence that Aristotelian notion of commutative justice was based on
rudimentary mathematical analyses. Aristotle assumed that legal transaction is something
more than just a contract. He presupposed the existence of economic relations and processes
such as a bargaining process and the theory of wealth maximisation.
1. Theories of Contract
The problem of reciprocity and equivalence in contracts is often discussed on the level of
theory of contract. I will hereby refer to an angloamerican general theory of contract where
the ongoing discussion is still inspiring. In civil law countries there is little need for general
theory of contract. The analyses of this topic is also strongly linked with the discussion of
particular legal institutions from a dogmatic and purely doctrinal perspective
3. The problem of
general theory of contract was vivid in XIX century civil law but at the moment it does not
attract the same attention
4.
  Generally, one may distinguish two types of theories of contract. According to the
subjective theory, parties enter into contractual relations because it seems to be subjectively
profitable. The terms of contract are negotiated and the contract is binding because of the fact
that both parties voluntarily agreed. Therefore, consent seems to be the source of a binding
force of contract
5. This and similar theories assume that freedom of contract stems from the
principle of individual autonomy. Contract may be validated only if the consent was vitiated,
but there was a typical procedural problem with the process of formation of contract.
Subjective theory is partly based on the economic reasoning: from the economic perspective,
if a party voluntarily enters into contract, it seems that she will comply with its preferences.
Neo-classical theory of contracts points out that the contract which maximises utility of at
least one party, the other being constant, is Pareto efficient
6. In fact, the main purpose of
                                                       
3 Cf. A. N. Hatzis, „The Anti-theorethical Nature of Civil Law Contract Scholarship and the Need for an
Economic Theory”, SSRN-LNS 2000, p. 2-6.
4 For the review of positions in French and German law, cf. J. Gordley, The Philosophical Origins of Modern
Contract Doctrine, Oxford (1991), p. 164-171,201-214.
5 R. E. Barnett, „A Consent Theory of Contract”, Columbia Law. Review 86 (1986) p. 291-307.
6 D. Faber, „Contract Law and Modern Economic Theory”, Northern University Law Review, 78 (1983) p. 310-
322.
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exchange (and the contract) is to achieve Pareto improvement so that the result of the contract
is Pareto-superior to the situation in which the contract would not have been concluded
7.
Thus the concept of freedom of contract may be analysed from the perspective of
interaction between the legal system and the economic environment in order that the legal
norms would enhance efficiency rather than waste of resources. In this place we intend to
present two possible approaches to such an analysis.
The first approach is characteristic for economic analysis of law. According to this
view the legal system should promote efficiency, understood as an allocative and static factor.
The criteria to measure it are based on the notion of utility and individual preferences. Thus,
the analytical tool to measure efficiency is associated with Pareto-efficiency (the increase of
utility of two parties or at least one part to a contract) or Kaldor-Hicks criteria (cost-benefit
analysis).
Taking into account incomparability of individual utilities such an analysis seems to
be inconclusive from the perspective of allocative efficiency or wealth-maximising demand,
i.e. it does not give any recommendations regarding the regulation of bargaining process and
especially the enforcement of efficient contracts. In this context, efficient contract is
characterised by the mainstream of law and economics
8 as a Pareto-optimal. Since the concept
of Pareto optimality refers either to individual utilities or to individual preferences or to free
consent, and all of these bases are either subjective or purely procedural (free consent), one
may state that these factors  give a very week support for any solution to the problem of
contractual equivalence.
9
The concept of Pareto efficiency and utility maximisation does in fact support both the
principle of freedom of contract and the principle of formal (procedural) reciprocity
10. In this
context the equivalence of obligations seems to require only the subjective reciprocity, i.e. the
situation in which the party finds the counter-performance as equivalent to the offered benefit
to the other party or detriment to the offered benefit. This might be found as an economic
justification for the legal rule in common law that the doctrine of consideration does not
require a substantial adequacy of consideration (i.e. obligation).
However, the legal order does not seem as a whole to include this rule. There are many
situations in which the court denies the enforcement of contract even if ex ante reciprocal.
This is the situation of ex ante and ex post contract. If the enforcement of contract was based
on the assumption that the subjectively reciprocal contract is in itself, ex definition,  profitable
for both parties, because the party would not consented to it if it had not maximised its utility,
there would be no need for the enforcement of contract at all
11. In fact the only problem
would arise concerning the possibility of non-compliance. This problem is solved by certain
rules such as exceptio non adimpleti contractus or by exchanging hostages in economic terms,
                                                       
7 H.B. Schäfer, C. Ott, Lehrbuch der õkonomischen Analyse des Zivilrechts, Berlin-Heidelberg-New York 2000,
3
rd ed., p. 389-393.
8 A contract is Pareto efficient if it is impossible to raise the expected utility of both parties to it – it is the first
best contract within the class of complete contracts. Cf. S. Shavell [in:] New Pelgrave Dictionary of Law and
Economics, vol. 1, p. 436.
9 Cf. J. Coleman, „Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization”, Hofstra Law Review 8 (1980), p. 520-523.
10 Cf. R. Posner , who he acknowledges that : “Economic analysis, at least, reveals no grounds other than fraud,
incapacity and duress (the last narrowly defined) for allowing a party to repudiate the bargain that he made in
entering into the contract.” ,Economic Analysis of Law, 2-nd ed. Boston 1977, p. 87.
11 This was a position of Roman law regarding informal conventions – nuda pacta, which had been generally
unenforceable. This is also an argument for unenforceability of contracts for differences and other derivative
contracts on OTC market, endorsed by L. A. Stout („Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market
Failure, and Securities Regulation”, Virginia Law Review 81 (1995), p. 611, L. A. Stout, „Why the Law Hates
Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the Market for OTC Derivatives”, Duke Law Journal 48 (1999),
p. 701).
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i.e. by securitization. Therefore the only problem would be the enforceability of half-
performed contracts, and in such a system the enforceability would deal exclusively with
unilateral contracts (when one party would perform its obligation whereas the other would
take the benefit of not performing its obligation).
In real life this is not the case. The most serious problems concerning enforceability of
contracts stem from the fact that one party has changed its mind or has found another better
opportunity. In those situations, common law accepts the so-called “doctrine of efficient
breach” and it allows damages instead of specific performance.
The doctrine of efficient breach may work smoothly only in such circumstances, that:
firstly,  there is a full access to market and the substitution of commodities is available (there
are general, not specific goods) and secondly, the non-performance (breach) of contract has
been declared before the performance of obligation (the executory contract).
However, in many situations the above-mentioned conditions are not fulfilled. Then, if
the party claims that the substantial inequity in terms of the value of obligations takes place
there are two possible solutions. Firstly, there is the substantial solution, requiring the
comparison of the value of obligations (goods, commodities). Such was the leasio enormis or
just price theory. The court used to compare the price paid to the market price. The typical
situation is, however, that there is no market price available both to the parties and to the
court.
Secondly, there are other cases such as imprevision, fundamental breach or Wegfall
der Geschäftsgrundlage, which may be implemented only in case of a drastic change of
circumstances. As the scope of randomness is not being measured, it is very difficult to  say to
what extend the change of circumstances should have been taken into account. The procedural
solution is based on the assumption that the self-interested individual does not make
detrimental contracts freely. If the contract is in fact detrimental to him, there is a high
probability that the consent was illusory and there was no agreement at all. This solution is
deployed in cases of duress or the abuse of bargaining power.
As a response to the defects of liberal (classical and neo-classical) theory of contracts
the other theories referring to the objective equivalence between performance and counter-
performance have been proposed. According to some objective theories, a contract is regarded
as an exchange
12 and the exchange should by fair not solely from a procedural point of view.
Those theories require a minimal equivalence between the obligations of two parties.
One of the most famous authors supporting such a proposition is James Gordley
13. In
series of articles he insists on the importance of equality in exchange. According to Gordley,
contract law is not based on the concept of freedom of contract but rather on the principle of
equality in exchange. He points out that the notion of commutative justice as formulated by
Aristotle has been abolished within the contemporary legal systems. On the other hand
Gordley stresses the need of reinterpretation of the notion of commutative justice. Therefore,
contract should be enforced in such a degree as it refers to the just price. Gordley understands
just price as a market price on a perfect, competitive market. He also identifies the price with
the marginal cost of supplier. Summarising, he points out that such doctrines as
unconscionability within the Angloamerican law, lesion in France and Wucher in Germany
reflect in fact the principle of equality in exchange. The basic foundation for this theory may
be found, according to Gordley, in Aristotelian concept of commutative justice, which means,
that no one should gain by other’s loss and in Roman law. According to the passage
D.50,17,206 of Digest: “By nature it is equitable that no one should be made richer by
                                                       
12 Cf. P. S. Atiyah, Essays on Contracts, Oxford 1996, p. 10-30, 329-338.
13 J. Gordley, “Equality in Exchange” California Law Review 69 (1981), p. 1587
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another’s loss or injury”.
14. The crucial argument for equality in exchange identified with the
market price is the following: “The market price depends on the judgement of many buyers
and sellers as to what future prices will be. In contrast, a contract price was determined by
only two parties, one of whom was acting under circumstances of ignorance or necessity that
prevented him/her from taking advantage of the market.”
15 On the other hand Prof. Gordley
requires another condition to be fulfilled, namely that the market price should be equal to the
marginal cost. The equality and fairness in contract should be measured according to the
purchasing power of the assets of parties. Those assets should remain unchanged after
performance of the contract, although the “wealth” of the parties measured in terms of utilities
increases.
Another theory, stressing the need of the objective equivalence in contract refers to the
concept of substantial unconscionability presented by Melvin A. Eisenberg
16. The principle of
unconscionability means that in some cases the contract can be invalidated  by a judge if there
is a gross disproportion between the obligations of the parties resulting from procedural or
substantial unfairness
17. In fact the “unconscionability” seems to become an instrument of
terms of contract. Despite this criticism, the judge may asses not only the fairness of the
bargaining process, but also of the results of bargaining process
18. M. A. Eisenberg proves,
that the control over the terms of contract is thoroughly justified. The principle of freedom of
contract should be limited in many cases if it results with harsh bargains. The main line of this
argument is also based on some reference to the economic theory. Eisenberg states that
substantial unconscionability results from a market failure. The bargain principle and the
freedom of contracts concern the situation in which the parties agree over the terms of
contract on a perfect market. Any distortion of the perfect market in form of a monopoly
power, asymmetry in information, price ignorance, exploitation of distress, may be regarded
as a potentially inferring unconscionability. In his defence of substantial unconscionability,
prof. Eisenberg formulated the principle, according to which the strongest case for legal
enforcement may be identified with the situation in which parties made a contract in a
perfectly competitive market and the plaintiff in fact performed his obligation (half-
completed bargain). Eisenberg distinguishes this situation from an executory contract
containing two promises creating legal obligations, but not performed. In such a situation and
in case of breach of contract, the party that want to sell the goods, may still do it on the
market. The paid price, i.e. the market price should equal or almost equal the opportunity cost
of the seller. The principle of freedom of contract should be limited to these contracts that are
made in a perfect market.
There is a hidden assumption in this reasoning that the objective equivalence of
contractual obligation is either equal to the market price in a perfectly competitive market or it
is measured by the court. This view is generally shared by P. S. Atiyah who proves that in fact
common law requires an adequacy of consideration in some cases, where it is efficient to
control the terms of contract, because of the gross inadequacy or unfairness
19.
                                                       
14 This text does not refer, however, to contract and is traditionally referred to unjust enrichment and tort. In
classical Roman law another principle was applied, namely: “it is permitted by nature for one party to buy for
less and the other to sell for more, and thus each is allowed to outwit the other. Cf. Digest D.19,2,22,3 and
D.4,4,16,4
15 J. Gordley, op. cit., p. 1612.
16 M. A. Eisenberg, „The Bargain Principle and Its Limits”, Harvard. Law Review 95 (1982), p. 741-801.
17 Cf. § 2-302 Uniform Commercial Code and § 208 of Restatement of Contracts (Second) (1981).
18 The distinction between procedural and substantial unconscionability has been drawn by A. Leff,
„Unconscionability and the Code; The Emperor’s New Clause”, Pa. Law Review, 115 (1967), p. 485.
19 P.S. Atiyah admits that: „ (...) courts will not interfere to iron out every trivial imbalance in an exchange; but
(...) when there is some gross imbalance, something serious enough to offend our sense of justice, it will usually
be found that some remedy is available”, op. cit., p. 338.
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Apart from those theories, there is another source of criticism about the principle of
the freedom of contract. Eric A. Posner implements economic analysis to defend some
substantial limits of the freedom of contract
20. In his model he criticises the view that legal
system should enforce voluntary contracts and at the same time it should not be engaged in
distribution of wealth. According to E. A. Posner, such assumption is both unrealistic and
does not lead to efficiency maximisation in the long run. He stresses the need to include the
welfare system which must operate in case of poverty. However, the system which supports
the poorest is costly. Contract law may prevent such a situation by virtue of limitation of the
scope of the freedom of contract in the situations that cause at least potential impoverishment
of one party. Therefore, taking into account the doctrine of welfare state, the limit of freedom
of contract may enhance efficiency deterring risky, socially costly transactions. E. A. Posner’s
model is based on the assumption that the minimum welfare state and welfare opportunism
creates in fact a moral hazard effect. In this respect restrictive contract doctrines may be
regarded as a more efficient instrument. Such doctrines as usury laws prevent the
development of excessively risky transactions.
Summarising, restrictive contract doctrines state that limitations of the freedom of
contract are or should be intended to minimise excessive risk in the transactions that involve
potentially poor party. In case of a breakdown such as a loss of income or other assets the
poor party would be entitled to payment from the state. Restrictive contract doctrines in fact
limit the freedom of contract of poor parties to prevent the cost of welfare benefits. At the
same time poverty is a standard of living, measured by minimum level of goods and services
and the utility level. In this respect E. A. Posner bases his assumptions on a kind of objective
criteria, namely on the standard of living. This certainly leads to the paternalistic theory of
restrictive contract doctrine.
2. Legal Doctrines
The tendency to narrow the scope of freedom of contract is not only a matter of
theoretical consideration. In fact we witness this process on a level of judicial decisions and in
legislation. Draftsmen of German Civil Code (BGB) decided to include the control of unequal
contracts from both procedural and substantive perspective. § 138.2 BGB states that the
contract is void in case of gross disproportion between performance and counter-performance
if the contract was brought about by the “exploitation of the difficulties, inexperience, lack of
judgement or serious indecisiveness” of the other party.
This is not however the only instrument to control an equivalence of obligations in a
contract. In a similar way courts may deploy the principle of good faith (§ 242 BGB) in case
of standard terms of contract. According to § 307 (2) 1 BGB standard terms are invalid when
they unfairly disadvantage the customer by modifying the essential rights or duties of the
parties which arise from the “nature of the contract”.
Standard terms are not included in this paper, since there are not negotiated contracts.
There are regarded as efficient and it seems that the only criteria to asses such terms are
closely linked to efficiency
21.
French Civil Code used to be perhaps the best example of liberal approach to contract
law. It is the first code stating explicitly the principle of freedom of contract in art. 1134 C.C.
which says that contracts are law brought about by the parties of the contract. Even this Code,
however, included a narrowed principle of laesio enormis in case of sale of land for less than
                                                       
20 E. A. Posner, „Contract Law in the Welfare State: a Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws,
and Related Limitations on the Freedom of Contract”, Journal of Legal Studies 24 (1995), p. 283-319.
21 Cf. R. Korobkin, „Bounded Rationality and Unconscionability: A Behavioural Theory of Policing from
Contracts”, UCLA School of Law Papers, Los Angeles 2002, [in:] http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=367172.
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seven-twelfths of its current value (art. 1674 C.C). In the French law except of a very narrow
concept of leasion there is no general remedy of this kind, nevertheless in practice the
judiciary of the Court de Cassation deployed the art. 1116 of C.C in order to broaden the
concept of deceit (dol). As an effect the party may by guilty of deceit if she exploits the other
party’s old age, serious illness, inexperience or personal difficulties, even if there is no precise
deceit in fact. It seems that the fact that the party took advantage of someone’s predicament is
enough to constitute dol.
In common law the situation seems unclear. Generally speaking, common law requires
the factor of consideration in form of something of value given in exchange for the promise to
be bound. This means that gratuitous promises are no contracts. On the other hand, the
adequacy of consideration is not required, and judges do not scrutinise, at least formally, the
equivalence between the value of obligations of the parties to the contract.
In the american law the doctrine of unconscionability creates a good basis for
intervention in case of gross inadequacy. Unconscionability does refer to two groups of cases:
the first group consists of cases that are equal to duress, undue influence or misrepresentation,
and are generally called procedural unconscionability. Thus the concept of unconscionability
concerns the defect in the process of bargaining. There are, however, other situations in which
despite of a lack of such a defect, the contract may be invalidated (§2-302 UCC) or found
unenforceable (Restatement of Contracts (Second) (1981) § 208), if there is a gross
disproportion between the obligations of the parties. In this case, the so-called “substantial
unconscionability” allows to control some terms of contract and even, in case of serious
disproportion, to change the terms or to refuse to enforce them
22.
This concept of substantial unconscionability has influenced also some of the English
decisions. In one of the most famous cases of this kind
23, Schroederer v. Macaulay Lord
Diplock expressed the opinion that the obligation of one party should have reflected the
obligation of another party. In this case the House of Lords stated, that the contract in which
an author granted a publisher the irrevocable right to publish his entire literary was void
24.
Notwithstanding the controversies about unconscionability and its meaning the English
common law has many other doctrines based on the assumption that some harsh bargains
must not be allowed. If there is a special relation between the parties the trust relationship
arises and the weaker party might rely on the professional or other person giving advice. If
there is a contract between such persons, the weaker party can claim that the contract was
disadvantageous to this very party. This specific rule has been broaden by Lord Denning in
Lloyds Bank v. Bundy.
25 In this case Lord Denning stated a general principle that common law
protects the weaker party from disadvantageous contracts: “Gathering all together, I would
suggest that through all these instances there runs a single thread. They rest on inequality of
bargaining power. By virtue of it, the English law gives relief to one who, (...) enters into a
contract on terms which are very unfair or transfers property for a consideration which is
grossly inadequate”.
26
Summarising we may observe that not only the jurisprudence but also judiciary and
legislature deploy many different techniques and legal instruments to maintain the balance
between parties, at least in case of gross inequality between the obligation of parties. These
efforts are not limited to situations in which the inequality or disproportion results from the
procedural failure such as fraud or duress. In fact, many cases are based on a vague notion of
                                                       
22 Campbell Soup C o. v. Wentz, 172 F. 2
nd 80, 83 (3
rd Cir. 1948).
23 Cf. A. Schroederer Music Publishing Co, Ltd. v. Macaulay (1974) 3 All E.R. 616; Clifford Davis Management
Ltd. v. W.E.A. Records Ltd (1975) 1 All E. R. 237.
24 Cf. The criticism to this decision by M. Trebilcock, „The Doctrine of Inequality of Bargaining Power: Post-
Benthamite Economics in the House of Lords”, University of Toronto Law Review 26 (1976), p. 359.
25 Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Boundy, (1975) QB, 326.
26 Ibid, p. 339.
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commutative justice. In these circumstances we may ask whether such a claim for
commutative justice regarded as an objective equality of obligations is analytically and
historically justified.
3. Synallagma in the Doctrine of Civil Law
The problem of equivalence in contracts is encapsulated within the doctrine of
synallagma. Synallagma generally means an interaction between the parties, interdependence
of their legal and economic position. Therefore, if it is considered as a strategic
interdependence synallagma may be analysed from the game theory perspective.
Nevertheless, before implementation of the game theory, it is necessary to present briefly the
legal meaning and content of the term of synallagma.
Synallagma is a notion that is characteristic feature within the contemporary civil law
dogmatic studies concerning the structure of bilateral contracts.
27 The question of the
construction that is equivalent to this structure is a subject of controversies in legal
literature.
28
Moreover, the rule of synallagmatism may be regarded in its three forms. Firstly, it
concerns genetic synallagma when the existence of obligation of one party is dependent on
the corresponding obligation of the other party. Secondly, conditional synallagma concerns
the execution of obligation and, in particular, the situation when the execution of the task by
one party creates the obligation to execute the task by the other party of a contract.
Traditionally, this type of synallagma is connected with the possibility of raising the
exemption of non adimpleti contractus. Thirdly, functional synallagma concerns the internal
aspect of a contract and is connected with the notion of mutuality and equivalency of
obligations. The essence of the relationship among obligations in this case is that the
obligation of one party is the equivalent of the other party’s obligation or that the obligation
of one party is  regarded by the other party as an equivalent one.
As far as the contemporary civil law systems are concerned, generally speaking they
adopt the subjective version of equivalency. Similarly, the Polish Civil Code in art. 487 § 2
defines the mutual contract as a contract when both parties agree to create an obligation in
such a way that the task of one party is the corresponding task of the other party.
Moreover, the true meaning of classification of the various kinds of synallagma
depends on the type of construction of the obligatory contract, adopted within the legal
system. Thus  the issue of genetic synallagma or the state of dependence of the creation of one
obligation on the creation of the other, within the German legal system is linked to the general
rule of causality of obligatory legal acts and the system of making the obligatory contracts
                                                       
27 See U. Klinke, op. cit., p. 15. According to H. P. Benöhr, this rule may be characterised as „gegenseitige
Abhängigkeit von Forderung und Gegenforderung in den gegenseitigen Verträgen” (H.P.Benöhr, op. cit., p. 1).
The notion of synallagma or synallagmatism are also a useful instrument for reseach upon the obligatory
structure of bipolar legal acts, causality or unjustified enrichment. See P. Jabornegg, Zurûckbehaltungsrecht und
Einrede des nicht erfûllten Vertrages; zuglech ein Beitrag zur Lehre vom Synallagma, Wien 1982; R. Müller,
Gesellschaftsvertrag und Synallagma; die Anwendbarkeit die Normen ûber die synallagmatischen Verträge auf
den Gesellschaftsvertrag, Zûrich 1971; W. Schmidt-Rimpler, Die Gegenseitigkeit bei einseitig bedingten
Verträgen insbesondere beim Versicherungsvertrag: zugleich ein Beitrag zur Lehre vom Synallagma, Stuttgart
1968; R. Koch, Das Synallagama des Versicherungsvertrages, Aarau 1957; H. G. Leser, Von der Saldotheorie
zum faktischen Synallagma: ein Beitrag zur Lehre vom Wegfall der Bereicherung, Freiburg 1956.
28 For example, within the German legal studies it is connected to § 320 BGB (J. Esser, E. Schmidt, Schuldrecht:
Allgemeiner Teil, Heildelberg-Karlsruhe 1975, p. 31, 123; F. Leonhard, Allgemeines Schuldrecht des BGB,
München-Leipzig 1929, p. 335) or in a broader sense with the notion of bilaterality (W. Schmidt-Rimpler, op.
cit., p. 42).
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based upon §§ 107, 134, 138, 139, 154, 155, 306 BGB.
29 Within the French legal system
genetic synallagma has a close link with the rule of causality of obligatory legal acts, which is
expressed in art. 1131 C.C., and within common law it is combined with the doctrine of
consideration.
30 The notion  of genetic synallagma is also linked to a group of theories
developed within the dogmatic studies of civil law about the mechanisms of completion of
obligatory contract, such as the theory of aim exchange, theory of the basis of legal act,
conditional theory, and the theory of legal act’s causa.
A  slightly different classification of the types of synallagma was presented by G.
Teubner. This classification is based on the criterion of the function of synallagma.
31 Teubner
differentiates various kinds of synallagma’s functions on the basis of defining synallagma as
the inner limit of the parties obligations. Therefore, synallagma may be characterised as the
legal basis of obligation (Geschäftsgrundlage), as the inner structure of obligations oriented
towards the aim lying at the basis of the creation of contract (vertragsimmanenter
Zweckstruktur), as the relationship between the existence and execution of obligations of
parties to a  contract which may be treated as a pending condition (Leistungsbedingung), and
as the inner limit of obligations (immanente Leistungsbeschränkung).
It seems that irrespectively of the issue of classification or defining the character of
genetic synallagma, the conceptualisation of this notion within the German legal doctrine has
been accompanied with serious difficulties connected with the lack of a uniform statement
within the legal sciences as far as the  issue of legal results of this construction is concerned.
In the opinion of the part of the German legal doctrine, the notion of genetic synallagma is
linked to the structure of obligation connected to the reason or causa of legal acts. The notion
of causa within the German law of obligations is highly relevant as far as it is linked with the
basis of unjust enrichment and not with the creation of obligations or their validity. In other
words, in the German law causa is not an element limiting private autonomy.
32
Moreover, the characterisation of the legal consequences connected with genetic
synallagma is not uniform,
33 especially in comparison with the case of functional and
conditional synallagma which are linked to § 320 BGB.
34 One may indicate, however, as
connected with genetic synallagma within the German Law, a group of legal norms relating to
the legal character of legal act defined as the element of contract. Generally, there are four
theories connected with the legal consequences of the construction of genetic synallagma in
German law: the theory of the aim of exchange (Austauschzwecktheorie), the theory on the
legal basis of obligation (Geschäftsgrundlagetheorie), the theory of conditional obligations
(Bedingungstheorie) and the theory of legal reason (Causatheorie).
                                                       
29 F. Rittner, „Über die Entbehrlichkeit des sog. genetischen Synallagmas”, [in:] Rechtsbewahrung und
Rechtsentwicklung. Festschrift für Heinrich Lange, München 1970, p. 215; G. Kegel, „Verpflichtung und
Verfügung – Sollen Verpflichtungen abstrakt oder kausal sein?” [in:] Internationales Recht und
Wirtschaftsordung. Festschrift für F.A. Mann, München 1977, p. 66; L. Enneccerus, H.C. Niperdey, Allgemeiner
Teil des Bürgerlichen Rechts, Tübingen 1959, 15
th ed., § 202 p. 1218.
30 See P.S. Atiyah, op. cit., p. 180-185.
31 G. Teubner, Gegenseitige Vertragsuntreue, Tûbingen 1975, p. 3- 4, 19, 74, 103.
32 Nevertheless, it is reasonable to indicate in German law of obligations the lack of causa resulting in the
creation of claim based on unjust enrichment. In fact, there is a unique instrument serving the regulatory function
in connection to the results of the ex-post failure of the obligatory contract, namely causa of real (property)
contract. In this moment, it is worth to note out the explanation of W. Flume stating: „Betreffs der
schuldrechtlichen Kausalgeschaefte dagegen spricht man in allgemain von der „causa” nur betreffs des
Verhaeltnisses des schuldrechtlichen Kausalgeschaeft der Rechtsgrund ist.” (Das Rechtsgeschaeft, Berlin 1979,
p. 170).
33 U. Klinke, op. cit., p. 103.
34 This and the following articles of BGB define the character of relationships among the obligations of the
parties of mutual contract. See K. Larenz, Allgemeiner Teil des Deutchen Bûrgerlichen Rechts, Mûnchen 1989,
7
th ed. p. 29, 248-25, 330, 568-572, 631.
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The first theory, characterised as the theory of the aim of exchange
(Austauschzwecktheorie), is based on the construction of obligatory contract as an exchange
of obligations.
 35 Such a notion of exchange is connected with the bilateral obligatory legal act
and thus it is an exchange of a legal rather than economic character. The relationship between
the obligations or tasks of the parties is linked to the aim of contract understood as the
exchange of obligations.
 36 The aim of exchange is to ensure the obligation of one party,
which is the response for the obligation of the other party. The less direct aim is situated not
only on the legal sphere but also within the economic one and it demands the execution of
obligation by the other party of obligatory contract.
K. Larenz did not link the aim of exchange solely to the reason of obligation. The aim
of a party to the contract which is to create an obligation of the other party, and finally, the
execution of this obligation, is grounded in the obligation of this very party. As there exists
among the parties a relationship of dependence, which is defined as genetic synallagma, the
party to obligatory act is forced to perform also the aim of the other party. In other terms, the
aim of the other party is indirectly also the aim of the party. This common aim was defined by
Larenz as the objective aim of the legal act and the objective aim of a contract.
 37.
U. Klinke pointed out that the objective aim a contract understood in this way is not
identical to the notion of causa which is linked to the subjectively defined notion of the aim or
rather reason of the parties of obligatory act.
38 The objective aim of a contract is, however, the
aim common for both parties which is connected not only to the particular obligations or tasks
but which is evident of the sense of whole transaction. The objective aim cannot be identified
with the will to receive an obligation executed by the other party. It is identified rather with
the will to receive an obligation by the other party in exchange for the execution of obligation
by  first party. The aim is connected not only to claim of the party but also her (his) obligation
which has a willed and voluntary character.
Additionally, it seems that genetic synallagma understood in this way which is related
to the notion of the objective aim of a contract may be identified also with the typical aim of a
given type of transaction in economic sense. According to K. Larenz, common objective aim
of a contract is defined by the contract rules.
 39 Therefore, the construction of genetic
synallagma is a substitute for the theory of causa of obligatory legal acts. It is possible to
analyse the structure of the obligatory contract also on the basis of defining the basis of a legal
act.
 40
According to the second theory (of the legal basis of obligation
(Geschäftsgrundlagetheorie), the notion of genetic synallagma as a basis for relationships
between the obligations of the parties to a contract is linked to the value of obligations and
equivalence of obligations in economic sense. This  theory was formulated by W. Schmidt-
Rimpler in relation to the analysis of the legal character of insurance contract.
41 He stressed
the validity § 320-323 BGB as the rules expressing the relationships among the legal
character of insurance contract and the group of norms of civil law connected to mutual
contracts. Hence, the insurance contract may be defined as mutual contract with an
unconditional obligation of insurance holder to pay the insurance premium and with a
                                                       
35 See K. Larenz, Gescäftsgrundlage, p. 79.
36 K. Larenz defines the aim of exchange in the following terms: „Der nächste unmittelbare Zweck einer jeden
Vertragspartei bei einem gegenseitigen Vertrag ist der, die Gegenleistung zu erhalten”, K. Larenz, op. cit., p.
104.
37 Objektiver Vertrags- und Geschäftszweck, ibidem. See also G.Teubner, op. cit. p. 20.
38 U. Klinke, op. cit.,  p. 105
39 K. Larenz, Lerbuch des Schuldrechts..., § 15 I, p. 167.
40 K. Larenz, Geschäftsgrundlage, p. 105; U. Klinke, op. cit., p. 106.
41 W. Schmidt-Rimpler, Gegenseitigkeit, p. 2-7; W. Schmidt-Rimpler, „Zum Problem der Geschäftsgrundlage”,
[in:] Festschrift fûr Hans Carl Nipperdey, Mûnchen-Berlin 1955, p. 1-30.
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conditional obligation of insurance giver to pay the sum of insurance, which is conditional
upon the existence of a factual situation having a character of a pending  condition.
The issue analysed by W. Schmidt-Rimpler is whether the mutual character of
insurance contract and the application of § 320 and the following articles of BGB, requires the
existence of two obligations which are equivalent, valid and independent of the fulfilling of
condition. He proposed to differentiate two levels of mutuality of obligations. The first  level
is related to the existence of the opposite obligations by the parties. This level of relationship
among the parties obligations is connected to the notion of the common aim in performing a
contract (Zweckverwirklichungsprogramm). The second level is related to the relationship
among the economic value of one obligation and the corresponding value to a contra-
obligation, i.e. to the mutuality of obligations as defined by their value (Wertverhältnis).
42
According to Schmidt-Rimpler it is only this kind of equivalency of obligations that is
relevant while using the criterion of mutuality.
43 Moreover, he described the relationship
between  the value of obligations as having the structure of a mutual contract in the form of
genetic synallagma. At the same time, such a basis of the value of obligations is a basis of the
value of a legal act (Geschäftsgrundlage).
The theory of conditional obligations (Bedingungstheorie) primarily concerns the
construction of functional and conditional synallagma. It seems that some influence on such a
formulation of relationship between the conditional character of the mutual obligations of the
parties and the notion of synallagma may be placed on art. 1184 c.c., which is a rule
concerning the conditional character of obligations arising from the creation of a mutual
contract while the condition on claiming the execution of obligation by one party is in itself
the execution of obligation by the other party of a mutual contract. The opinion inspired by
such an understanding of a conditional character of a mutual contract is present in the
conception of H. Hoeninger.
44 He treated the conditional character of mutual contracts solely
to the notion of the conditional and functional synallagma, and further claimed that the notion
of genetic synallagma is a redundant concept within the German legal system. According to
Hoeninger, the mutual contract was not in reality a contract created under a pending condition
understood in the technical legal sense, consistent with § 158 BGB.
45
One should also consider the opinion of A. Blomeyer, which treated the notion of
genetic synallagma as a term corresponding to the conditional character of the parties
obligations in case of a mutual contract.
46 Additionally, when taking into account that both
parties obliged themselves on condition that the other party would execute her (his) obligation
one should indicate not only on the conditional character of the obligation but also on the
conditional character of the contract.
 47 As the technical legal meaning of the notion of
condition as a future and uncertain action within the sense of § 158 BGB, the condition in the
form of an execution of the obligation by the other party has the character of a si volet (will)
condition.
48 Therefore, the genetic synallagma may be described as a combination of two,
mutually intertwined conditional obligation.
The  critics of the above theory underline the fact that this reasoning explains neither
the character of relationships existing among the obligations of the parties nor the reason of
                                                       
42 Ibidem, p. 61. This opinion was criticised by L. Raiser, [in:] „Vertragsfunktion und Vertragsfreiheit”, [in:]
100-jahre deutsches Reschtsleben. Festschrift zum 100-gen Bestehen des Deutchen Juristentages 1860-1960,
Karlsruhe 1960, vol. 1, p. 118; H. Bartholomeyczik, Äquivalenzprinzip. Waffengleichheit und
Gegengewichtsprinzip in der modernen Rechtsentwicklung, AcP 166 (1966), p. 54-57.
43 W. Schmidt-Rimpler, Gegenseitigkeit..., op. cit., p. 61; W. Schmidt-Rimpler, „Zum Problem...”, op. cit., p. 6.
44 H. Hoeninger, Die gemischten Verträge in Ihren Grundformen, Mannheim-Leipzig 1910, p. 226-236.
45 Ibidem, p. 229.
46 A. Blomeyer, Studien zur Bedingungslehre, Berlin-Leipzig 1938, p. 114.
47 Ibidem, p. 111. Similarily R. Koch, op. cit., p. 37.
48 Hoeniger, op. cit., p. 228, U. Klinke, op. cit., p.115.
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their obligations. Therefore it is not a sufficient theoretical explanation of the system of the
creation of contracts and the character of mutual contracts which had been adopted within the
German legal system.
The theory of legal reason (Causatheorie) is highly relevant mainly within the French
legal system. Nevertheless, also in the German legal system there were undertaken some
attempts at identifying the construction of genetic synallagma with the notion of causality of
obligatory contracts.
49 The starting point for such theories is the statement than the structure
of a mutual contract has a causal character, i.e. it concerns the aim of a party and this aim is a
real reason for the creation of obligation.
It seems, however, that the genetic synallagma understood in this way, as a
construction of mutual obligations and related to the aim of a party having a subjective
character, has no essential influence within the German legal system. In contradiction to the
French legal system, the creation of any contract does not require the existence of a legal
reason for its validity. Nevertheless, the notion of causality may have a meta-legal meaning in
regard to causa understood as a reason for the completion of a contract. In fact, such a reason
may be a counterperformance of the other party. The notion of causa relates therefore to the
intentional character of obligations, concerned with the fact of obligation of the other party.
50
In the above-presented situation one may speak about the dual character of the aim.
Firstly, the intentional character is evident in the reception of obligation of the other party, i.e.
in the decision of the consent for the obligation. Secondly, this character may be prescribed to
the obligation of the first party. Moreover, this construction is reflected within the system of
contract creation by offer. According to U. Klinke the genetic synallagma is identical with the
so-called causal structure of mutual obligations.
 51
Summarising it should be pointed out that there is a tension between subjective and
objective meaning of the reciprocity and mutuality in civil law doctrine. The legal science
intends to interpret a model of exchange in order to  solve particular problems such as lack of
causa or non-performance by one party.  On the other hand those models may prove the
restrictions of freedom of contract. This is in fact the proposition of K. Larenz, who proposes
the notion of mutual contract having objective purpose, namely the exchange, overcoming the
intentions of individual parties. In this model this objective purpose is valid from legal
perspective and the contract may be analysed in reference to it.
On the other hand none theory of synallagama has been unanimously accepted in legal
doctrine.  The discussion and solutions endorsed by legal doctrine seem inconclusive in this
respect.
4. Historical Argument: Commutative Justice in Aristotle
Synallagma may also be regarded as a pre-juridical relation between parties of the
bargaining process as well as a voluntary act of exchange. Nevertheless, these aspects
pinpoint to certain problems connected with the mathematisation of synallagma and the
question of arithmetical proportion as well as the problem with value-formation. Synallagma
is linked to transaction analysed in isolation rather than forming a part of free-market
exchange process.
The analysis of the notion of justice made by Aristotle, originally aimed at
generalising the rules of distribution of goods within the public and private context. The
                                                       
49 J. Gernhuber, „Synallagma und Zession:, [in:] Festschrift fûr L. Raiser, Tûbingen 1974, p. 57.
50 U. Klinke, op. cit., p. 117.
51 U. Klinke said that: „Das genetische Synallagama ist die Causastruktur des Gegenseitigen Vertrages im
Augenblick, da dieser entsteht: Causa der jeweiligen Verpflichtung ist die Verpflichtung des Gegners”, (op. cit.,
p. 120).
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notion of the distributive justice may be regarded as the rule connected with the allocation of
a part of the given whole based upon the principle of geometrical proportionality. Aristotle
used the notion of (corrective) rectificatory justice in order to pinpoint the punishment for the
damages or wrongful acts based upon the principle of arithmetic proportionality.
52 The
commutative justice should not use the rules of distributive or corrective justice.
53 According
to Aristotle, the damage which is being committed by the wrong-doer and the damage which
is suffered by the victim, are not necessarily identical, therefore there exists a sphere of
indeterminacy between the subjective nature of act and the result of the act. Thus, the
exchange of various goods may be connected with greater loss than profit.
54
Aristotle used the notion of proportionality and natural justice in order to define the
„natural” limits of exchange,
55 and he linked these notions with the Greek concept of
harmony.
56 The crucial issue of the application of commutative justice within the social
sphere means that in regard to social relations the sum of subjective values is not necessarily
equal to the same values treated in an objective way. Aristotle developed the notion of social
aggregation as the sum of unitary benefits is greater than the whole sum in the objective
meaning.
The process of assessing the just proportions within the barter exchange between two
parties whose aim is to get the goods from each other, is dependent upon the will of A to
possess the goods of B more than possessing one’s one goods, and vice versa. These four
relations form the introductory condition for the existence of commercial transactions. It may
be assumed therefore, that the motive encouraging people for completing exchange contracts
is not duress or relations of dependence but rather the mutual benefits raising from exchange.
One then may ask a question whether is possible to make an exchange which would be unjust
in relation to the party engaged in this exchange?
The answer of Aristotle points that in case of lack of mutual benefits there is no
exchange, and hence the sole fact of exchange contains also its explanatory factor. This
assumption had been an integral part of the Greek law of sale, in which the contract was not
binding until the proper exchange was done. On condition that it was performed in a
voluntary way, this exchange was regarded as a just one.
57
The notion of a subjective utility within the performed exchange seems to point out to
the possibility of using the analysis on the basis of a mathematical proportion. The
fundamental statement of Aristotle concerning the exchange among two parties on the basis of
the commutative justice is made in regard to the example with a house-builder and a shoe-
maker.
58 This fragment treats the subjective utility as an introductory condition of exchange
but it is directly related neither to the emergence of the factor of mutual benefit arising from
the exchange nor to the fairness of exchange within the sphere of a voluntary choice. It seems
that Aristotle used the „natural” basis of a voluntary exchange in which both of the parties
compare one’s own goods with the goods of the other party in a subjective way, and in the
same time defining the sphere of mutual benefits conducive to the act of exchange.
                                                       
52 An example may serve the rule that two thirds of the profit should belong to this partner who had given two
thirds of the original capital for a given enterprise. See S.T. Lowry, „Aristotle’s Mathematical Analysis of
Exchange”, History of Political Economy 1 (1969), p. 47-49.
53 See Ethics 1132b20-25 and 30-34.
54 Within this context Aristotle used the example of exchange between a house-buider and a shoe-maker; see
Ethics 1133a10-15; 1133b1.
55 These reflections were later applied within the scholastic debates concerning the notion of a „fair price”; see
S.T. Lowry, „Aristotle’s Mathematical...”, op. cit., p. 49.
56 See. G.E.M. Anscomb and P. T. Geach, Three Philosophers, Oxford 1961, p. 73-74.
57 See F. Pringsheim, The Greek Law of Sale, Weimar 1950, p. 130-137.
58 See Ethics 1133a5-15. It is not certain whether is was Aristotle himself or the work of the later commentators
who had attached a diagram („figure of exchange”) to this example; see S.T. Lowry, „Aristotle’s
Mathematical...”, op. cit., p. 57-58.
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The issue concerning a legal justice within exchange was regarded by  Artistotle as
aiming at defining the middle of the sphere of a voluntary choice by both of the parties (Ethics
1133b30). He assumed that there exists the „best” set of laws or the „fairest” price of
exchange within the limits of choice and mutuality. The relationship of competition among
the parties is evident even before the conclusion of a contract. The factual price is precisely
defined either by the parties themselves or by the court as a result of a judicial process.
Within the contemporary literature the ethical doctrine of Aristotle is compared to the
neo-classical school of economics.
59 J. Schumpeter explained that the conceptions precisely
defined by Aristole were used as tools for analysing the existing in his time market
mechanisms. Scientific interests of Aristotle within the theory of price led him to a broader
analysis of the functioning of the market. According to Schumpeter, these solutions are being
used in the later theory of neo-classical welfare economics and it seems that Aristotle himself
would have used the prices being defined within the competition process as the criteria of
commutative justice.
60
The theory of marginal utility by Jevons may also be characterised as containing the
solutions „in spirit and form, assumptions and conclusions” analogous to the theory of
Aristotle.
61 K. Polanyi criticised the analysis of Schumpeter, making a claim that he did not
understand the Greek economic conditions in a proper way. According to Polanyi, the aim of
Aristotle was not to create a unique economic theory but rather to elaborate on a social theory
enabling one to analyse phenomena of a serious meaning and a profound moral dimension,
i.e. aiming at reaching „unlimited profit” within commercial activities.
62
M. Finley stresses that the lack of economic analysis within the theory of Aristotle
does not stem out from his lack of knowledge about free-market mechanisms but rather from
his steadfast conviction that the morally justifiable degree of richness,  which is necessary in
order to lead an ethical life is very much limited.
63 Moreover, Aristotle regarded economic
activities as rooted in social processes and this conviction resulted in his lack of interest in
analysing the mechanisms of the functioning of the market itself.
It seems that the linkage between the theory of Aristotle and the economic theory may
be determined also within the normative perspective. If the moral choice contains the making
of selection among competitive aims, then the moral agent should seek the maximisation of
the highest „meta-aim”, pursuing the other aims only until the moment when the benefit
resulting from the indirect aim is equal to the costs included in the non-undertaken
alternatives. Within the economic sciences the notion of the highest aim concerns utility, and
the theory of Aristotle points out in this regard to happiness. This principle seems to be the
fundamental moral imperative concerning the general market equilibrium theory.
64
The above-mentioned principle is linked to the rule of Aristotle, which does not have
solely the character of a moral norm or a technical rule connected to the moral choice. If  the
aim of economic activity is defined as supplying in a greatest possible degree the material
                                                       
59 See S.T. Worland, „Aristotle and the Neoclassical Tradition: the Shifting Ground of Complementarity”,
History of Political Economy 1 (1984), p. 107-112.; O. Langholm, Price and Value Theory in the Aristotelian
Tradition, Bergen 1979, p. 164.
60 J.A. Schumpter, History of Economic Analysis, New York 1954, p. 58-61.
61 See Proceedings of the American Philosophic Society (1952), p. 66-72.
62 Moreover, K. Polanyi points out that the mechanisms of supply and demand, which are acting within the
sphere of free-market, and which are the subject of analysis of the neoclassical theory of economics, were not
known to Aristotle; see K. Polanyi, „Aristotle Discovers the Economy”, [in:] K. Polanyi et al. (ed.), Trade and
Market in the Early Empires, London 1957, p. 64-94.
63 See M. I. Finley, „Aristotle and Economic Analysis”, Past and Present 5 (1970), p. 3-25.
64 See K. J Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, New York: John Wiley 1951; K. J Arrow., „The
Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market versus Nonmarket Allocation”,
[in:] The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures: The PPB System, Joint Economic Committee, 91
st
Cong. 1
st sess., Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office 1969, p. 44.
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tools for the full cultural development of men, then the society should elaborate on a kind of
procedure for achieving efficiency while using the existing resources, similar to that of a free-
market economy, based on the principle of justice.
65
The above interpretation leads to distinguishing two kinds of relationship between the
moral theory of Aristotle and the neo-classical theory of economics. The theory of Aristotle
may be regarded as the ethical fundament for the economic theory. The economic theory
seems to a completion for the theory of Aristotle while determining the necessary conditions
for a proper moral choice.
Therefore, one may state that it is possible to recognise two subjects of the
commutative justice. The first subject is connected to the deepening of reflection upon the
ontological status of sunallagma ecousia as well as upon the notion of equality among the
objects of these relations. This line of research is linked to the objective aspect of sunallagma
ecousia and relates to the broader sphere of theoretical philosophy, and in particular
metaphysics, anthropology and philosophy of knowledge.
66
The other subject is connected with the operationalization of commutative justice
within the direction of its normative application as a basis of private law  in the area of
contracts, and more broadly in regard to the notion of synallagma within the law of
obligations in general. This line of reflection aims at operationalization of the model of
arithmetical proportion, which was formulated by Architest and subsequently presented by
Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics, into the direction of possible application within the
contemporary economic and social conditions of the so-called market society.
 67 The research
is also connected the relationship between the subject of sunallagma ecousia and a formal
expression of this relation in the shape of mathematical model corresponding to the
Aristotelian notion of arithmetical proportion.
68 Therefore, it is a method of creation of social
and economic conditions, which make it possible to implement the postulate of equality in the
relations of exchange. Such an operationalization has become the area of interest of the
contemporary economic sciences. The notion of equality within the ontological perspective
may be compared to Pareto-optimum.
The contemporary concepts of commutative justice tend to explain the omissions and
inadequacies of the theory of Aristotle. In this respect one may pinpoint the critique of this
                                                       
65 Within this context one can underline an interesting remark of J. N. Keynes. While  dealing with the scope of
methodology of economic sciences (The Scope and Method of Political Economy, New York 1955, 4
th ed., p. 61-
63) he stressed the existence of an intermediate sphere between the science of political economics and the area of
applied economics, which subject is situated not only within the economic perspective but also the moral
dimension of economic activity of the society.
66 See A. Kaufmann, Über Gerechtigkeit: dreissig Kapitel praxisorientierten Rechtsphilosophie, Kõln 1993, p X,
23, 137-156, 398-511. See also E. Betti, Über sogenannte faktische Vertragsverhälnisse, Berlin 1956, p. 254-
270; K. Larenz, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissentchaft, Berlin 1975, 3th ed., p 183-187; W. J. Samuels,
„Interrelations between Legal and Economic Processes”, Journal of Law and Economics 14 (1971), p. 435.
67 As far as the notion of „market society” is concerned, see: F. A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty. A New
Statement of the Principles of Justice and Political Economy, vol. 1: Rules and Order 1973, p 113; T. J Lewis,
„Acquisition and Anxiety: Aristotle’s Case Against the Market”, Canadian Journal of Economics 11 (1978), p.
69; K. Polanyi, The Great Transformaion, New York 1944, p. 23-45.
68 See J. Coleman, op. cit., p. 509; N. Kaldor, „Welfare Propositions in Economics”, Economic Journal 49
(1939),p. 549-552; A. T. Kronman, „Wealth Maximazation as a Normative Principle”, Journal of Legal Studies
9 (1980), p. 227-232; N. Mercuro, S. G. Medema, Economics and the Law. From Posner to Post-Modernism,
Princeton 1997, p. 12-34; R. A. Posner, „The Economic Approach to Law”, Texas Law Review 53 (1975), p.
205; R. A. Posner, The Economics of Justice, Cambridge Mass. 1983; R. A. Posner, „The Decline of Law as an
Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987”, Harvard Law Review 100 (1987), p. 761, R. A. Posner, The Problems of
Jurisprudence, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1990; R. A. Posner,  Economic Analysis of Law, 4
th ed., New York
1992, p. 23-56, R. A. Posner, „The New Institutional Economics Meets Law and Economics”, Journal of
Institutional and Theoretical Economics 149 (1993), p. 73; R. A Posner., Overcoming Law, Cambridge,
Massachusetts 1995; R. A. Posner, Frontiers of Legal Theory, Cambridge, Massachusetts 2001.
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theory developed within the philosophy of law by Hans Kelsen who had made a claim of the
existence of the error of petitio principii as far as the tautological  character of the relationship
between the proportion and the rule of justice is concerned.
69 Kelsen had underlined that in
his opinion there is only a illusive difference between the commutative and distributive
justice. It seems that this critique demands a systemic answer, which would give a new sense
to the Aristotle’s notion of commutative justice and would aim to operationalize this
conception so that it may become the relevant point of reference for the contemporary
solutions within the scope of private law. Therefore, one may propose the answer to the
problem on a three-fold basis.
Firstly, it should take the form of a deepened reflection and redefinition of some ot the
rules which form the fundament of moral and political philosophy of Aristotle, in order to use
these rules as a basis for a renewed neoaristotelian moral philosophy
70 and a philosophy of
private law.
71
Secondly, the other form was shaped as the theory of autonomy of private law,
constructed on the basis of broadening Aristotle’s conception of commutative justice with the
notion of subjective right and the autonomy of will of the parties, which is characteristic for
the notion of law  within the theory of Hegel and Kant
 72.
Thirdly, the issue is relevant also on the level of the contemporary use of mathematics
in order to solve the problem connected both with exchange as well as distribution of goods.
This is being done within the economic analysis of law movement. It was proposed, among
others, by R.A. Posner and may be described as an attempt of a formal operationalization of
the notion of commutative and corrective justice with the use of a method which is
characteristic to economic sciences. It seems therefore that the postulate of the commutative
justice has the aim of shaping the legal regulations in such a way as if to enforcing the optimal
allocation of resources, according to the model provided by the Pareto optimum.
73
Since the problem of commutative justice and voluntary synallagma is in fact placed
in the context of interaction between parties, it may also possible to operationalise it by virtue
of the implementation of game theory and the analyses of bargaining problem. Aristotle
intended to describe the transaction placed within the context of “face to face bargain”. It
seems that he regarded such a bargain as the legitimate and realistic foundation of the process
of formulation of the specific rate of exchange (including price formation it the situation in
which there is in fact no institutionalised market). Such an approach is intended to be
presented in this paper.
                                                       
69 H. Kelsen, What is Justice?, New York 1957, p. 125-136.
70 Such a task is foreseen within the neoaristotelian political philosophy presented in the work of A. MacIntyre,
After Virtue. A Study in the Moral Theory, Boston 1992, p 242; see also M. J. Golecki, „Cnota czy wspólnota
polityczna” (Virtue or Political Community. Some Remarks on Alasdair MacIntyre: After Virtue. A Study in
Moral Theory), Kwartalnik Konserwatywny (The Conservative Quarterly) 2000, no. 6, p. 128.
71 Within this context such attempts are undertaken mainly by J. Gordley. See his „Equality in Exchange”,
California Law Review 69 (1981), p. 1587-1594; S. J. Heyman, „Aristotle on Political Justice”, Iowa Law
Review 77 (1992), p. 851; see also G. P. Fletcher „Corrective Justice for Moderns”, Harvard Law Review 106
(1993), p. 1658.
72 E. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law, Cambridge-London 1995, E. Weinrib, „Corrective Justice”, Iowa Law
Review 77 (1992), p. 403; E. Weinrib, „Right and Advantage in Private Law”, Cardozo Law Review 10 (1982),
p. 1283, E. Weinrib, „The Gains and Losses of Corrective Justice”, Duke Law Journal 62 (1994), p. 277, P.
Benson, „The Basis of Corrective Justice  and Its Relation to Distributive Justice”, Iowa Law Review 77 (1992),
p. 851.
73 See R. Cooter and T. Ulen, Law and Economics, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley 1997, p 12;  A .T. Kronman,
„Wealth Maximazation as a Normative Principle”, Journal of Legal Studies 9 (1980), p. 227; A. T. Kronman and
R. A. Posner (eds.), The Economics of Contract Law, Boston: Little Brown 1979; R. A. Posner, „Ronald Coase
and Methodology”, Journal of Economic Perspectives (1993), p.195.
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5. Contract Formation and Synallagma as a Bargaining Problem
The concept of Pareto–optimum regarded as a form of commutative justice does not
determine which division of the gain from exchange is just or fair. According to the standard
economics, all distributions situated on the contract curve are Pareto-optimal, independent on
the precise division of gain between the parties. It stems from the definition of Pareto-
improvement that only the utility of one contractor may be maximised whereas the other
remains unchanged. The Edgeworth’s Box illustrates this kind of indeterminacy.
Identification of Pareto-efficient contract with a just o fair contract leads in fact to tautology.
The parties enter the contract because in maximises their utility. It does not mean, however,
that the parties agree on the level their utility is maximised. In one word, the contract may be
Pareto-efficient and at the same time it may be still regarded as unfair.
On the other hand the problem of freedom of contract and its limits resulting from the
requirement of substantial equivalence between performance and counter-performance may
be analysed on a basis of game theory
74. As mentioned before, synallagma is just the kind of
interaction between contracting parties. Such an interaction takes three forms: firstly, genetic
synallagma which is a description of co-ordination problem, secondly functional synallagma
encapsulates division problem, and thirdly conditional synallagma is a legal description of
defection problem and possible non-performance.
According to M. A. Eisenberg the contract law is in fact created as a response to the
problem of non-performance. The situation in which one party performs its obligation and the
other does not, reminds a typical Prisoner’s Dilemma game
75. If the contract law is a response
to the Prisoner’s Dilemma than it may be analysed on one hand, from the perspective of non-
cooperative game theory, and cooperative game theory on the other (as an agreement over the
rate of exchange). Additionally, the distribution of surplus of utility gained through the
contract typically results from the bargaining process. Then we may assume, that the
formation of contract and formation of its terms is also a result of bargaining process
76.
Therefore, a question arises whether it is possible to predict the result of bargaining
within such a process and whether this result may be regarded as fair. In this context one may
rely on the model proposed by J. L Coleman, D. D. Heckathorn and S. M. Maser who
provided the game theory analysis of default rules and disclosure in contract law
77. They
stress a need to encapsulate the whole decision-making calculus implemented when the
individuals use in drafting contracts.
In this model contracting is regarded as parallel to the three kinds of synallagma:
genetic, functional and conditional. It seems that the analyses of only one of them does not
provide the stable basis for the bargaining theory of contract, because all three types of
synallagma are connected in the sense that together they create a set of constraints within
which a contract formation may take place. Synallagma thus understood reflects the general
rules of the contracting game.
Contracting encapsulates three problems; coordination, division, defection. Each of
these problems may be separately described as a Prisoner’s Dilemma. The contracting cannot
                                                       
74 There are not many examples of the implementation of the game theory to the economic analysis of contract
law. Cf. A. Katz, “The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law of Contract
Formation”, Michigan Law Review 89 (1990), p 215-294.
75 M. A. Eisenberg, „The Bargain Principle and Its Limit”, Harvard Law Review 95.(1982), p. 743-745.
76 This approach has been also criticised. E. Rasmusen points out that contract formation is based rather on
negotiation process than bargaining. Negotiations tend to set the terms of agreement, whereas bargaining is just a
redistribute process of rent seeking. Cf. E. Rasmusen, „A Model of Negotiation, Not Bargaining: Explaining
Incomplete Contracts”, The Social Science Research Network, http://papers.ssrn.com. (2001), p. 1-6.
77 J. L Coleman, D. D. Heckathorn and S. M. Maser, „A Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Rules in
Contract Law”, Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 12 (1989) p.639.
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be regarded as isolated one feature of rational decision, as there are in fact three such
characteristics which interact between themselves. This problem can be captured in the so-
called “divisible Prisoner’s Dilemmas”
78. In this game each player has to make a triple choice:
whether to contract or not, which terms of contract to choose (contract 1 or 2), and whether to
perform or to defect.
This game which is in fact a single non-cooperative game may be transformed in two
cooperative games by virtue of the process of “backward induction”. The first cooperative
game deals with negotiating over enforcement costs. These costs include the safeguards of
compliance (e.g. the exchange of hostages or collateral clause). The second game involves
negotiations over the gains from trade (split of cooperative surplus). In this way the outcomes
of one game influences the potential payoffs of the next game. The main assumption is that if
information is complete, cooperative games are solved. The solution is based on another
assumption, namely, that the contract will minimise the sum of the costs imposed by one
player on another one. In fact, this is a restatement of a well-known and controversial
































Coordination problem is resolved, if both parties share a common interest in
contracting (C1, C2 respectively) over individual action (D). A division problem may be
captured as a choice between the offer of A (contract 1) and the offer of B (contract 2). In fact
both have to agree on one contract.
The problem of bargaining and fixing terms of contract is exactly based on this. J. L
Coleman, D. D. Heckathorn and S. M. Maser try to solve the problem taking the assumption
that there is some joined rationality of agents. This  assumption is based on the interpretation
of the bargaining theory by D. Gauthier as well
80. According to this interpretation, players
                                                       
78 Very similar model has been presented by F. Parisi, The Formation of Customary Law, paper presented at the
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th Annual Conference of the American Political Science Association, Washington 2000, p 13-17.
79 Cf. D. Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, Oxford 1986, p. 145.
80 D. Gauthier, op .cit., p. 15, introducing the notion of “constrained maximiser”. Cf. D. D. Heckathorn, „A
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may make binding concessions so that they can minimise they claims respectively,
maximising the joint result. In fact this assumption allows Gauthier to presuppose that players
in Prisoner’s Dilemma game will cooperate.
The terms of agreement to cooperate between parties specifies the actions that should
be carried out and the rewards and punishments relating to compliance or defection. A three-
dimensional choice includes generally three phases of contracting: firstly pre-phase, when the
decision whether to seek a contract is taken. Rational parties would cooperate on the
assumption that cooperation will create a join gain or cooperative surplus. Secondly, there is
the negotiation phase in which the parties have to agree upon the terms of contract. Thirdly,
there is the post-phase in which the parties make the decision whether to perform the
obligation or to brake the contract.
The pre phase is based in this model on joint rationality. If Ui  is the expected utility of
party i and Di is utility from disagreement, U = (Ua,Ub) is a given agreement’s utility vector,
and U’= (Ua’, Ub’) is any other feasible agreement’s utility vector, U is jointly rational if for
each feasible outcome U’,  Ua  > U a’ or  U b> U b’
The negotiations phase is based on concession rationality. This kind of rationality
requires concessions made by the parties. Typically, concession is understood as agreeing to
an outcome less preferred than the most preferred outcome. Assuming that C1 is a best hope
outcome of A and C2 is the best hope outcome of B, the parties’ best hopes outcomes are
situated on the opposite ends of the contract curve. In those circumstances there are two
possibilities: either one party (player) makes all concessions agreeing on the others’ player
best hope outcome or both parties will make such concessions. In this model, bargaining in
fact depends on the allocation of concessions. Under conditions of perfect information, each
player will agree to an outcome only if the concessions required from him correspond to the
concessions of the other player. J. L Coleman, D. D. Heckathorn and S. M. Maser state that
on assumption of equal rationality of the parties each party makes equal concessions.
The post-phase is dominated by individual rationality. In this phase, where the payoffs
from cooperation are fixed, the problem of defection dominates. In this model the authors
assume that defection will take place if Ui < Di. Such a situation means that within the process
of bargaining the concessions of i led to the situation when the utility from disagreement is
lower than from performance of agreement. This in fact means that in the process of contract
formation there is little room for harsh bargains. Defection depends on the utility awarded by
contract – the lower awarded utility, the higher incentive for defection. Correspondingly, hard
bargain will result in the increasing of incentive for defection.
Nevertheless, while taking into account the payoffs in the divisible Prisoner’s
Dilemma defection in case of the performance may be a dominant strategy. It is a common
knowledge that in case of half-performed contracts (contracts where one party as a first one
performed its obligation), defection and taking advantage from the performance already
rendered by other party is a dominant strategy. In this place it should only be mentioned that
the contract law is a just response for this problem. Defecting party within the legal system
does no longer play in Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Then if one loses the case as a defendant,
the defecting party must theoretically pay judicial costs and pay damages. This changes the
payoffs in a drastic way. On the other hand, the system in which contracts are not enforceable
is also imaginable. This solution would require exchanging hostages and real threats that
would also change the rules of exchange so in the end there would be no longer a Prisoner’s
Dilemma situation
81. This is, however, too expensive method to implement and in this sense
contractual system saves those resources and diminishes a price of exchange.
                                                       
81 Cf. A. Kronman, „Contract Law and the State of Nature”, Journal of Law and Organization 5 (1985), p. 81.
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It should also be observed that J. L Coleman, D. D. Heckathorn and S. M. Maser
assume that the criteria of fairness should be endogenous to transaction relationships
82. In
their model of bargaining “in the shadow of law”, contracting is supposed not to be
constrained by any external standards of fairness. In fact, along with Gauthier, they regard the
process of rational contracting as specifying the relevant conception of fairness.
The above-mentioned authors of the model assume that law may play a role of a
cognitive resource for the parties. Taking into account the form of divisible Prisoner’s
Dilemma, it may be true that legal rules will save transaction resources by the way of solving
two problems: coordination and defection. The problem of coordination (genetic synallagma)
is somehow solved by the system of an offer and acceptance and special rules determining the
moment and the way in which the contract is concluded.
83 The problem of defection is tackled
by the rule that grants damages in case of breach or in some special cases, the specific
performance may be ordered by the court. There is also a commonly accepted rule stating that
performance and counter-performance should be exchanged at the same time. According to
the principle of conditional synallagma, in case of non-performance, the exception of non
adimpleti contractus may be raised by the defendant against the plaintiff who claims
performance but has not completed his obligation.
This does not however solve the problem of the equivalence in contract. There is no
rule supporting one fixed rate of exchange. J. L Coleman, D. D. Heckathorn and S. M. Maser
admit that the problem of the third party’s (court’s) intervention depends on the amount of
endogenous transaction resources. If the resources are scarce there is a good reason for such
intervention. One of the best resources’ provider is just a free market which may protect
against defection before the obligation is performed. On the other hand the access to the
market will increase the set of alternatives and shift the disagreement point.
Bearing in mind that the position of the parties (players) in bargaining situation
depends predominantly on the set of alternatives (disagreement point) we can analyse
bargaining problem in two environments: firstly, in a free Coasian bargaining in ZTC world,
with the perfect access to the perfect market (max extreme)
84 and secondly, in an
institutionalised bargaining environment  within the scope of the organisation which on one
hand limits the bargaining power, and on the other hand provides a set of rules to compare ex
post the outcomes of the bargaining process (no access to the market, the rules of fairness are
treated as given within the institutionalised framework. Such situation is close to the
bimonopoly).
Intuitively it seems that the envy free rules are not existing outside the institution
within which both parties operate. In first case they are depending exclusively on the
subjective comparison of the outcomes based on individual preferences or the rule of fairness
is regarded as ex post (the rule changes accordingly with the changes of bargaining solution).
In the second case,  the standard for interpersonal comparison may be fixed ex ante but the
rule is contextual and it influences as such the individual preferences in similar situations to
the extend that the hypothetical unfairness of the solution is diminished (as such the rules of
justice incorporated within the society may be regarded as fair for this society or institution,
as in case of Rawlsian model of justice
85, the moral equilibrium model of equality and justice
in Dworkins model
86, or the ethical preferences in Harsanyi
87, where the subjective
                                                       
82 J. L Coleman, D. D. Heckathorn and S. M. Maser, op. cit., p. 652.
83 Mailbox rule seems to be on of such rules; the offer is accepted since the acceptance is put to the mailbox.
84 Cf. the remark of K. Binmore, Game Theory and the Social Contract II, Just Playing, Cambridge, Mass.-
London 1998, p. 137, who notes that: „Insofar as practical applications are concerned, the claim that bargaining
outcomes will be approximately Pareto-efficient when transaction costs are small becomes particularly suspect
when one of the bargainers has a large outside option”.
85 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice,  Oxford 1972, p.12, 60, 75-83,136-138.
86 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire,  Oxford 1998, p. 337-348.
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preferences are changed by the ethical preferences accepted under the assumption of
equiprobability).
In this case I presume that the typical “face to face “ bargaining should be placed in
one of the two contexts mentioned above (and being extremely unrealistic: in the first case;
total individualism, in the second total ex post collectivism). Moreover, in order to place the
bargaining situation in relatively realistic circumstances some empirical date should be
provided. Firstly, the game theory treats its rule as the exclusive. The best example of this
statement is the interpretation of the Nash bargaining solution. Secondly, the experimental
ultimatum game proves that the solution chosen by the players equals to the real  outcome of
50/50 to 60/40 in case of the division of 100, with the other subgame of a perfect split 99/1.
88
The explanation of these results is possible if we take into account the rules of fairness
changing the individual preferences so that the result reaches almost 50/50. This is what may
be subscribed as an “ethical” or fairness rule expectation, i.e. the expectation not only in terms
of utility maximisation, but also a distributive fairness in given situation
89.
It seems that this “distributive fairness expectations” does not belong to the bargaining
process itself. In one word it is an exogenous factor and as such requires some “Archimedean
point”. The problem of a fair distribution is in fact not a part of private law90. J. L Coleman,
D. D. Heckathorn and S. M. Maser claim however that the problem of division and fairness is
crucial for private law
91. Notwithstanding their theory of transactional resources they claim
that their model of bargaining implies that when courts impose distributive justice schemes on
contracting parties it is in the interests of these parties. This intervention is “contextual” in the
sense that distribution does not revoke any general principles of justice. It is limited to the
scope of outcomes within which the parties would have bargained. On the other hand the
authors suggest that by acting efficiently courts usually base their solutions on widely
accepted principles of fairness and distributive justice.
The model provided by J. L Coleman, D. D. Heckathorn and S. M. Maser and
especially their interpretation is questionable. It suggests, that although fairness should be
endogenous to the bargaining process and the result of bargaining process should be fair by
definition, in some cases the intervention of court is necessary. Such an intervention should
not be “exogenous”. These assumptions are in my opinion contradictory. Criticising this
model I would like to point out also some methodological problems related to the version of
bargaining theory adopted by those authors. In fact they have implemented the bargaining
theory as proposed by Gauthier and adopted his model to the problem of contracting.
The bargaining theory presented by Gauthier includes some basic still controversial
assumptions. Gauthier assumes that agents are able to comply with mutually advantageous
constrains. The agent may be called “constrained maximiser”. This assumption leads Gauthier
to the conclusion that rational players can cooperate in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. In fact
Gauthier’s players implement strongly dominated strategies. This assumption seems to be
based on the fallacy of the twins. Assuming the existence of complete information and full
rationality of the players, one can assert that both of them will make the same choice so that
                                                                                                                                                                            
87 J Harsanyi, „Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and the Interpersonal Comparison of Utility”, Journal of
Political Economics, 63 (1955), p. 309-321.
88 Cf. J. Hoffman and P. Spitzer, „Entitlements, Rights and Fairness: An Experimental Examination of Subjects’
Concept of Distributive Justice”, Journal of Legal Studies 14 (1986), p. 259; P. Kahneman et al., „Fairness and
the Assumptions of Economics”, Journal of Business 59 (1986), p. 285.
89 The situation changes if the sum to be divided is bigger. It seems that if the sum is big in comparison to the
budget of the player, the result of the game will correspond with the subgame perfect equilibrium. In this
situation the split is supposed to attain 99/1.
90 Cf. F. A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty. A New Statement of the Principles of Justice and Political
Economy, vol. 2: The Mirage of Social Justice 1976, p. 40, 132.
91 J. Coleman et. al., op. cit. p. 687-688.
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two outcomes in Prisoner’s Dilemma are possible: defect/defect or cooperate/cooperate. The
problem is that the model of rationality presupposed by the game theory would not defend the
choice of the second strategy
92.
D. Gauthier formulates also the principle of “minimax relative concession”. Regarding
the bargaining process as a two-stage process of claim and concession and taking into account
that each player is equally rational, each of them tend to minimise his/her concession
assuming that the other will do the same. On the other hand, as K. Binmore suggests,
concessions are costly and it is difficult to explain why rational players would regard the
initial claims as relevant.
In conclusion we may comment that the implementation of Gauthier’s model of
bargaining is perhaps not the optimal instrument to explain the bargaining process and that it
is doubtful whether it may provide a stable basis for the theory of contract
93.
In this part I would like to concentrate exclusively on the division problem. The
problem  which the terms of contract to choose may be presented as another non-cooperative
game, namely Rubinstein’s bargaining game
94. In this game both players are making
proposals (offers and counter offers) until one of the offers is accepted
95. The factor of time in
which the agreement is reached is taken into account, so that ä represents the amount of
decrease for a party for each period of time.
If A offers x, he retains the share 1-x. Additionally the discount of time should be
taken into account. In these circumstances  the counteroffer from B is more attractive for A
than his next offer if it gives (1-x) ä. The game illustrates the thesis that the outcome of the
bargaining process is diminishing in time (“the cake is shrinking”), so that the sooner one
offer is accepted, the better.
This game has a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium: A offers B: ä/(1+ä) and does not
accept any counteroffer from B. B accepts any offer equal or greater than ä/(1+ä) or makes a
counteroffer of (1-x)ä. A receives 1-x or 1/(1+ä). The strategy of A is never accepting a
counteroffer, taking into account that the B’s counteroffer is not larger than (1-x)ä. The best
strategy of B is to take the initial offer. Thus A makes the offer large enough so that B is not
able to make a counteroffer preventing repetition of the same offer.
 The model assumes that in special case (ô￿0) where there is no time interval between
the rejection of proposal  and a new proposal there is virtually the advantage of the party who
makes the offer first. There are no incentives to cheat in this game and no mechanism for
sustaining commitments is required. Within time the game converges to Nash bargaining
solution. Additionally the possible asymmetries between the parties result from the different
attitudes to the passage of time. In fact the interpretation of Rubinstein’s bargaining game
stresses that the more patient party has more bargaining power. The difference does not lie in
the bargaining skill because both parties are rational optimisers.
The result of the game corresponds to the Nash solution to the bargaining problem.
Bargaining solution is a function f (P,c), where P is payoff space, c – conflict point. The
bargaining outcome is represented in utilities (u1, u 2). The Nash bargaining solution:
(P,c)￿  f (P,c)= arg max (u1 -c1 )(u2- c 2)
                                                       
92Cf. K. Binmore, „Bargaining and Morality” [in:] D. Gauthier and R. Sugden [ed.], Rationality, Justice and
Social Contract, London 1993, p. 137.
93 Cf. K. Binmore, Game Theory and the Social Contract II, Just Playing, Cambridge, Mass.-London 1998, p.
139-142.
94 A. Rubinstein, „Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model”, Econometrica 50 (1983), p. 97-109.
95 The same model of Rubinstein bargaining game has been implemented to solve the bargaining problem in
Peenvyhouse v. Garland. Cf. D. G Baird, G. H. Gertner, R. C. Picker, Game Theory and the Law, Cambridge,
Mas. 1995, p. 224-241.
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satisfies four axioms: independence of equivalent utility representation, symmetry,
independence of irrelevant alternatives and weak efficiency (Pareto-optimality).
96
Fig. 1
According to fig. 1 point Q coincides with Nash bargaining solution. At the same
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0 characterises an old ratio incorporated eg. in public law
and based on social contract.
Thus we may assume that Nash solution to bargaining problems predicts the outcome
of bargaining process in face to face bargains. The question arises whether this model may
give some support for the estimation of the bargaining result from the perspective of fairness.
In both models (Gauthier and Nash) the authors explicitly exclude such possibility. For
Gauthier, the morality or fairness is encapsulated within the bargaining process. The social
contract which is the result of such processes seems to be a point of reference for fairness and
morality. For Nash the invariance of irrelevant alternatives means that the bargaining process
is contextualised and gives no general basis for the estimation of fairness
97. According to A.
Sen the output of the bargaining process depends on the scope of alternatives and the
disagreement point.
98
According to the interpretation of Nash solution provided by M. Holler and S. Napel,
the problem of fairness is impossible to resolve, taking into account the incomparability of
individual utilities
99.
                                                       
96 J. F. Nash, „The Bargaining Problem”, Econometrica 50 (1983), p. 155-162.
97 Cf. K. Binmore, op. cit., p. 143-147.
98 A. Sen, Collective Choice and Social Welfare, San Francisco 1977, p. 118-121.
99 M. J. Holler, S. Napel, „On Interpersonal Comparison of Value” [in:] K. Nevalainen (ed.) Justice, Charity,
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The other problem concerning Nash solution refers to the lack of monotonicity
100. This
property of Nash solution looms large in case of implementation and interpretation. In fact it
is possible that although the surplus from contract increases,  one player may get less than in
case of  previous, lower surplus. Nash bargaining solution does not have monotonicity
property, because one player may achieve a smaller solution payoff in game (X, c) than in
game (Y, c) even if Y is a subset of X.
101 Such a situation may be criticised from the
perspective of fairness. This property does not qualify the appealing characteristics of Nash
program in general and Nash solution to bargaining problem. However it stresses the need of
further development in cooperative games theory
102.
Conclusion
Those observations generally prove two suggestions. Firstly, in the circumstances in
which the comparability of utilities is not possible, the objectivisation of the notion of fairness
is unattainable. From this perspective, the result of bargaining process is either unfair from the
ex ante perspective, or is always fair from the ex post perspective
103.
Secondly, the difference between the ex ante and ex post perspective is crucial. To my
mind it is in fact the difference between distributive and commutative justice. The norms of
commutative justice stem always from the bargaining process applied to the individual
transactions.
As a result, the freedom of contract may be ex post limited in cases in which the result
is not unfair, but rather if it leads to socially undesirable effects. This is just a result of the
implementation of the Rawlsian principle, according to which the inequalities should be
justified, among other reasons, because they improve the situation of the most deprived
members of society
104. From this perspective it is however arguable whether the restrictions
of the freedom of contract may be legitimate
105. It seems, that in the cases in which the
voluntarily agreed contract leads to potential impoverishment of the weaker party, the welfare
system and a public policy seem to be more adequate instruments than the contract law.
Game theory does offer a basis for the principle of commutative justice regarded as an
exchange ratio established through the bargaining process. The solution to the bargaining
problem depends on a disagreement point and includes the attitude toward risk. At the same
time it provides a Pareto-efficient outcome (this being one of the axioms formulated by Nash).
In those circumstances it seems that the basis of the legitimacy of such solution is
endogenous, thus the solution predicts the result of bargaining process.
The concept of the solution of bargaining problem seems to precise the requirements
of the Aristotelian commutative justice. Commutative justice refers to the result of face-to-
face bargain between the parties in single transactions. The problems of relations between
                                                       
100 Cf. E. Kalai „Solutions to the bargaining problem” [in:] L Hurwicz, D. Schmeidler and H. Sonnenschein
(ed.), Social Goals and Social Organization, Essays in the Memory of Elisha Pazner, Cambridge 1985 p. 84-85;
E. Kalai and M. Sworodinsky, „Other Solutions to Nash’s Bargaining Problem”, Econometrica 43 (1975), p.
513-18.
101 M. J. Holler, S. Napel, op. cit., p. 129.
102According to Kalai only the proportional solution to the bargaining problem is monotonic. Cf. E. Kalai,
„Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situation: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons”, 45 Economietrica (1977),
p. 1623-1630.
103 In this case, according to K. Binmore: „fairness and justice are concepts without an a priori meaning”. Cf. K.
Binmore, Just Playing, Game Theory and the Social Contract II, Cambridge, Mass.- London 1998, p. 87.
104 Cf. J. Rawls, op. cit.,  p. 60.
105 In that point it should be stressed that courts are not the best institutions to impose distributive schemes. As.
H.B. Schäfer and C. Ott note: ”Daraus folgt, dass es nicht Aufgabe etwa des Richters ist, die konkrete
vertragliche Regelung am wohlfahrtõkonomischen Modell zu ûberprûfen und darûber zu wachen, dass nur
solche Verträge rechtlliche Anerkenung erlangen, die das Pareto-Kriterium erfûllen”, op. cit., p. 393.
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commutative justice and fairness refer partly to the relation between commutative justice seen
as a single contract and norms of distributive justice based on social contract. On the other
hand both contracts have the same legitimacy, and so does commutative and distributive
justice. Both formulation of justice may not satisfy the requirement of fairness This only
means that there is no conceptual priority of distributive justice over commutative justice, as
both of them result from the contractual process (individual or social respectively).
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